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The Predictions
Over the past three years, we have
published several articles—including in
News from Within and M’tsad Sheni—
where we made a series of very
‘contrarian’ predictions on the new wars.1
Specifically, we claimed that:
1. Direct US intervention would conven-
iently, if not intentionally, fail to
‘stabilize’ the Middle East;
2. The new wars would not make oil
plentiful and cheap, but scarce and
expensive;
3. The leading oil companies would profit
greatly from the new environment of
heightened instability and soaring oil
prices;
4. Rising oil prices were likely to fuel
global stagflation (stagnation together
with inflation); and,
5. The shift toward stagflation—should
it occur—would not hinder accumulation
but boost it, particularly for the largest
corporate coalitions.
When these claims were first made, they
were greeted with a mixture of
ind i ffe rence  and  hos t i l i ty.  The
conventional ‘postisms’ of ethnicity, race
and culture pay little attention to capital
accumulation, oil prices or inflation, and
none whatsoever to their analysis. After
all, argue the ‘postists,’ these are not real
processes, but rather ‘narratives’ and
‘discourses,’ and as such there can be
little to analyze in them beyond their own
‘text.’
By contrast, analysts of politics and
economics deal extensively with such
questions—but to them our arguments
sounded like conspiratorial nonsense.
Indeed, until very recently, the common
sentiment was that direct US intervention
would stabilize the Middle East. The
Americans, it was commonly believed,
would quickly topple Bin Laden and
Saddam Hussein, wrestle the evil OPEC
to the ground and bring down the price
of oil—all in the interest of securing the
‘new economy’ of neoliberal globalization
and inflationless growth.
As it turns out, the pundits got it wrong.
Contrary to the ‘postist’ view, the new
wars, although wrapped in religious-
ethnic ornaments, indeed seem to be ‘all
about oil .’ And yet,  contrary to
conventional political-economy, the ‘oil
connection’ here is very different from
what the experts led us to believe. Three
years after September 11th, it is pretty
clear that:
1. The US plan to conquer Afghanistan
and Iraq was bound to destabilize the
region for  years to come;
2. It was the US attacks on Iraq and
Afghanistan—and not the incompetence
of OPEC—which helped double the price
of oil to $40 per barrel.
3. Publicly, OPEC and the oil companies
emphasize the ‘need for stability’ but
privately use instability to laugh all the
way to the bank;
4. With the cost of energy soaring, global
inflation is making a comeback despite
the lingering stagnation; and finally,
5. Global dominant capital is rather happy
to see inflation in the offing.
The Sorry State of Capital
Theory
What accounts for the pundits’ misguided
focus and failing foresight? How could
so many experts ignore such important
processes, and why have most of them
fa i l ed  to  p red ic t  t he  new US
‘entanglement,’ the new ‘oil crisis’ and
the new ‘stagflation’?
The short answer is the sad state of capital
theory. These days, most of those who
write on social matters—global
or local—know little about capital
accumulation and care even less. And
those who do deal with accumulation—
namely the economists, including many
Marxists—often use antiquated categories
and theories that no longer fit present day
realities.
The result is that most commentators still
think of the new wars as ‘realist’ conflicts
between good and bad ‘ leaders.’
Conservatives insist that these conflicts
are necessary to eliminate or at least
contain the ‘axis of evil,’ while radicals
prefer to see them as ‘neo-imperialist’
attacks against ‘Third World’ victims. Of
course, both sides readily agree that, as
with all wars, here, too, there are various
‘commercial’ and ‘economic’ interests
that seek to tilt US policy one way or the
other. But these interests are seen as
secondary—or else, as too obvious to
require any detailed analysis. Apparently,
the more interesting questions pertain to
the ‘clash of civilizations’—that is, to the
myths of ethnicity, religion and culture,
and to the postmodern, post-Marxist and
post-Fascist fashions that keep those
myths going.
Unfortunately, as Simon Kuznets once
put it, the fact that a leaf floats in the air
does not imply the end of gravity.
Capitalism still rules the world and those
who ignore it are bound to misunderstand
it. Capitalism also keeps changing, which
means that we must revisit the concepts
and theories with which we analyze its
development. To keep abreast of
capitalism, we need to take example from
the enlightened path of Marx’s Capital,
not from the circus of the Althusserians
or the racism of the Bhabhaians. We must
focus on capital, the central institution
of capitalism; we must constantly re-
theorize it; and we must continuously
examine i ts  concrete  dynamics .
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Dominant Capital and the
New Wars
Our own re-theorization begins with a
claim that capital represents neither
neoclassical utility nor Marxist dead labor,
bur power—the power of its owners to
shape the process of social reproduction
as a whole. Based on this power
understanding of capital, we argue (1)
that the analysis should focus not on
capital ‘in general’ and many capitals ‘in
competition,’ but specifically on the
dominant capital groups at the center of
the political economy; and (2) that
accumulation should be understood not
absolutely, but differentially—that is, in
reference to the ability of dominant capital
to ‘beat the average’ and increase its
relative power.
The implications of this power perspective
are far reaching. For our purposes here,
they suggest:
1. That over time, corporate merger rather
than economic growth becomes the main
engine of differential accumulation
(‘breadth’); and
2. That under certain circumstances,
dominant capital can benefit greatly from
inflation and stagflation (‘depth’).
And, indeed, in our research we have
found that during the past century, global
accumulation oscillated between these
two regimes of merger and stagflation.
The most recent phase, which lasted
through much of the late 1980s and 1990s,
was clearly one of ‘breadth.’ During that
period, dominant capital benefited greatly
from an unprecedented wave of mergers
and acquisitions in the core countries. It
also profited from the opening up to
corporate takeover of the former Soviet
Union and the ‘emerging markets’ of the
so-called Third World, as well as from
the collapse of the welfare state and the
massive privatization of government
services.
This ‘breadth’ cycle, with its emphasis
on neoliberalism, deregulation, ‘sound
finance’ and disinflation, came to a close
at the turn of the new millennium. The
financial crisis that began in Asia and
later spread to the core markets, the
crumbling of the ‘new economy’ and its
scandalous accounting practices, and the
rise of global ‘terrorism’ and the ‘infinite
war’ to defeat it, have converged to make
capital movement look much less
tempting and mergers far less promising.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t w o  d e c a d e s  o f
neoliberalism have weakened pricing
power, thus raising the specter of price
and debt deflation for the first time since
the Great Depression.
Faced with these predicaments, capitalists,
particularly the larger ones, began
yearning for a little dose of ‘healthy’
inflation—in order to both avert debt
deflation and to kick-start differential
accumulation. As it turned out, the remedy
for their predicament—intended or
otherwise—was a new ‘Energy Conflict’
in the Middle East (that is, a conflict
related, directly or indirectly, to oil). Over
the past 35 years, such conflicts have
been the prime mover of oil prices, and
oil prices have provided the spark for
broad-based inflation. This process has
worked with frightening precision several
times in the past, and there was no reason
why it could not be set in motion once
again in the early twenty-first century,
with the very same effect.
Energy Conflicts, Oil Profits
and Inflation
The initial step in the process that leads
from ‘Energy Conflicts’ to broad-based
inflation involves the big oil companies.
The enclosed figure shows the history of
differential accumulation by the leading
oil companies—specifically, BP, Chevron,
Exxon, Mobil, Royal Dutch/ Shell and
Texaco.2 Each bar in the figure measures
the relative difference between the rate
of return on equity of these companies
and the average rate of return on equity
of the Fortune 500 benchmark. The grey
bars show years of differential accumula-
tion; that is, years in which the leading oil
companies beat the average with a higher
rate of return. The black bars show period
of differential decumulation; that is, years
in which the leading oil companies trailed
the average. For reasons which will
become apparent in a moment, these latter
periods signal ‘danger’ in the Middle
East. Finally, each explosion sign marks
the beginning of an ‘Energy Conflict.’3
The figure exhibits three related patterns,
all remarkable in their persistence:
 First, every ‘Energy Conflict’ in the
Middle East was preceded by a danger
zone, in which the oil companies suffered
differential decumulation.
 Second, every ‘Energy Conflict’ was
followed by a period during which the
oil  companies beat  the average.
 And, third, with only one exception, in
1996 to 1997, the oil companies never
managed to beat the average without an
‘Energy Conflict’ first taking place.4
* British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (until 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil since
1999), Mobil (until 1998), Royal Dutch/Shell and Texaco (until 2000). Company changes are
due to mergers.
Note: For 1992-1993, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special
charges.
Source: Fortune: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.
The Large Oil Companies* and Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts’
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We first articulated the process underlying
this figure in a series of discussion papers
written in the late 1980s. These papers
predicted the first Gulf War. Our argument
was further developed, along with the
figure presented here, in two journal
articles published in 1995 and 1996.
These latter papers predicted the second
Gulf War.5 Clearly, then, we are talking
here not of statistical witchcraft, but of a
rather robust logic.
Furthermore, this logic fits nicely with
the larger processes of ‘breadth’ and
‘depth.’ The figure points to three distinct
periods, each characterized by a different
regime of differential accumulation, and
each led by a different faction within
dominant capital.
During the ‘depth’ era of the 1970s and
early 1980s, differential accumulation
was fuelled by stagflation and driven by
conflict. The leading faction within
dominant capital was the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition of large armament
and oil firms. In this context, the oil
companies managed to beat the average
comfortably, with only occasional
setbacks that were quickly ‘corrected’ by
Middle East conflicts.
During the ‘breadth’ period of the late
1980s and 1990s, merger replaced
inflation as the main engine of differential
accumulation. The oil and armament
companies lost their primacy to a ‘New
Economy’ Coalition led by civilian high-
tech companies. Neoliberal rhetoric
replaced the welfare-warfare state,
conflicts in the Middle East grew fewer
and farther between, and the oil
companies commonly trailed the average.
Events over the past three years suggest
that this second period may have come
to an end, with the return to primacy of
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition.
The latter coalition, whose fortunes
dwindled since the stagflationary bonanza
of the 1970s and early 1980s, has come
back with a vengeance. Having helped
re-install the Bush family in the White
House, the coalition started looking for
new enemies and was only too happy to
exploit the opportunity offered by the
‘new Pearl Harbor’ of September 11th.
The Payoff
So far, these investments have paid
handsome dividends. With the Middle
East in flames and oil prices soaring, the
oil companies have already seen their
share of global corporate profit rise to
nearly 8 percent, up from less than 3
percent at the end of Clinton’s presidency.
Similarly, the armament firms are
currently enjoying the first upswing in
military spending since the end of the
Cold War. More broadly, corporate pricing
power has been restored, with talk of
deflation giving way to analysis of
inflation and stagflation. And, finally,
differential accumulation is again in
positive territory, with large firms
outperforming their smaller rivals.
Clearly, the personal fate of ‘state
officials,’‘policy makers’ and other
‘leaders’ is somewhat secondary in this
saga. George Bush may well lose the
elections, Osama Bin Laden may get
killed and Saddam Hussein may end up
at the gallows. But whether they stay or
go, live or die, the process they helped
set in motion is no longer easy to reverse.
Some of these developments may now
seem obvious, but they weren’t so only
a year ago—and they certainly weren’t
evident two and three years ago, when
we made our predictions. Until recently,
our analysis was discarded as ‘overly
economistic,’ if not ‘materialistic.’ The
articles we wrote were ceremonially
rejected by outfits such as Le Monde and
Alternatives Internationales (whose
editors in fact commissioned our papers),
and even by Monthly Review.
It is perhaps telling that the first to publish
these arguments was the AIC, which was
founded by ‘Matzpen’ Trotskyites twenty
years ago, in the era of Begin / Shamir /
Rabin / Peres. During those dark days,
before the ‘academization’ of the
‘Palestinian problem’ and when merely
speaking for the Palestinians was
considered treasonous, the AIC was the
only sane opposition and the sole source
of critical thinking and writing in Israel.
Its members always emphasized the
process of accumulation and the global
viewpoint, and were rarely mislead by
the fashionable hype of racism, religion
and culture.
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(5) “Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In: The Weapondollar-Petrodollar
Coalition—Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle-East ‘Energy
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446-515; and “Putting the State In Its Place: US Foreign Policy and Differential
Accumulation in Middle-East ‘Energy Conflicts’,” Review of International
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